A large-scale cyberattack involving compromised website scripts has exposed visitors to major global brands, including Ledger, Salesforce and BBC, to malicious software capable of stealing cryptocurrency and credit card information.
The campaign, identified as “Optimjack” by cybersecurity researcher Amirul Iman, exploited third-party website optimization scripts to distribute malicious JavaScript across numerous legitimate websites.
Security researchers discovered that the malware could secretly replace cryptocurrency wallet addresses, intercept payment card information and, in some cases, expose mobile users to additional security threats.
The incident highlights the risks associated with third-party software integrations, where a vulnerability in a single service provider can potentially affect hundreds of businesses simultaneously.
Nearly 180 Organizations Linked to Compromised Website Scripts
According to an investigation by cybersecurity company Report URI, the attack affected scripts associated with 178 organizations across multiple industries.
Among the affected businesses were cryptocurrency hardware wallet manufacturer Ledger, digital asset service provider Coinpass, and financial trading platforms IG, Interactive Investor and TMS Brokers.
The list also included major international companies and media organizations such as Salesforce, IKEA, Zoom, BBC and CNN.
These websites collectively serve millions of visitors, making the campaign particularly concerning because malicious code could reach users through platforms they normally consider trustworthy.
The attack was traced to scripts hosted through Optimizely, a digital experience optimization platform that allows companies to conduct website experiments and deploy customized JavaScript.
Rather than directly compromising each affected company’s infrastructure, attackers manipulated scripts distributed through the third-party service.
As a result, visitors accessing legitimate websites could unknowingly load malicious code without downloading suspicious files or visiting fraudulent domains.
Report URI CEO Scott Helme said BBC was among the earliest websites observed distributing the compromised Optimizely script, with malicious activity detected at approximately 4:21 am UTC on Monday.
By 9:52 pm UTC, most of the malicious code identified across 187 websites had reportedly been removed. The compromised script associated with Ledger was cleaned at approximately 8:41 pm UTC.
The difference between the number of affected organizations and websites reflects the broader distribution of scripts across multiple online properties.
Optimizely Confirms Security Vulnerability Behind the Attack
Optimizely acknowledged that an unauthorized actor had exploited a weakness in its Experimentation account registration process.
According to a company spokesperson, the vulnerability allowed malicious JavaScript to be inserted into certain customer projects.
The company subsequently blocked access to the vulnerable registration pathway and deployed a security fix.
Optimizely also removed injected code from affected projects, terminated active sessions, revoked authentication tokens and reset access credentials for impacted accounts.
Additional restrictions were introduced through Cloudflare to prevent the malicious code from continuing to reach website visitors.
The company said it had notified affected customers and was continuing its investigation.
Meanwhile, Salesforce confirmed that it was examining unauthorized modifications involving Optimizely scripts deployed on some of its websites.
As a precaution, Salesforce moved to disable Optimizely scripts across both preview and production environments.
Although the malicious activity has been linked to the Optimizely platform, investigators have not yet fully established how the attackers initially gained the access necessary to modify customer projects.
Malware Designed to Redirect Crypto Payments and Steal Credit Card Information
The Optimjack campaign combined multiple techniques intended to steal financial information from unsuspecting website visitors.
One of its primary functions was cryptocurrency address manipulation, commonly known as a clipboard hijacking or crypto-clipping attack.
When a user copied a legitimate cryptocurrency wallet address, the malicious script could replace it with an address controlled by the attacker.
If the user failed to verify the destination before confirming a transaction, the cryptocurrency could be transferred directly to the attacker’s wallet.
Because blockchain transactions are generally irreversible once finalized, recovering funds sent to an incorrect address can be extremely difficult.
The malware also included payment card skimming capabilities.
According to an analysis by cybersecurity firm StepSecurity, the injected JavaScript monitored website forms for sensitive payment information, including credit card numbers, expiration dates and card security codes.
The captured information could then be transmitted to infrastructure controlled by the attackers.
However, StepSecurity noted an important technical limitation.
The malicious script could not directly access payment information entered into cross-origin frames operated by independent payment processors.
This restriction may have reduced the attack’s ability to collect card details on websites using isolated third-party payment systems.
iPhone and iPad Users Faced Additional Security Risks
Beyond cryptocurrency theft and payment card skimming, researchers identified another potentially serious component of the campaign targeting Apple devices.
According to Scott Helme, the malicious JavaScript also loaded code associated with the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits when accessed through certain iPhone and iPad environments.
These exploit tools are associated with attempts to exploit vulnerabilities in Apple’s mobile operating system.
Their presence suggests that the campaign may have involved more than financial data theft through browser scripts.
However, the available findings do not establish how many devices, if any, were successfully compromised through these additional exploit components.
The discovery nevertheless illustrates how a compromised third-party website script can become a delivery mechanism for multiple types of malicious activity.
Financial Impact Remains Unclear Despite Widespread Exposure
Although the campaign reached a substantial number of websites, investigators have not confirmed the total financial damage.
Blockchain records reviewed by Cointelegraph showed that cryptocurrency addresses associated with the malicious scripts had received approximately $7,100 on Monday.
A separate investigation by StepSecurity estimated that the identified wallets collectively held or received around $6,600.
However, researchers cautioned that some wallet activity occurred before the attack, making it difficult to distinguish stolen funds from unrelated transactions.
Alex Thorn, head of firmwide research at Galaxy Digital, offered an even lower estimate of the potential losses.
In an analysis published on X, Thorn suggested that victims may have transferred only about $2,300 to the addresses connected to the campaign.
He also observed that much of the Bitcoin activity appeared to involve funds belonging to the attackers themselves, potentially circulating through cryptocurrency exchanges before returning to their wallets.
These findings indicate that the total amount received by suspicious addresses should not automatically be interpreted as confirmed victim losses.
The extent of payment card data exposure remains even less certain.
Helme acknowledged that investigators could not determine how many credit card records or browser cookies had been transmitted to the attackers’ servers.
Consequently, the full impact of the campaign may extend beyond the cryptocurrency transactions currently visible on public blockchains.
Third-Party Software Becomes a Growing Cybersecurity Weakness
The Optimjack incident demonstrates how attackers can exploit trusted software providers to distribute malicious code across otherwise legitimate websites.
Instead of targeting individual companies separately, compromising a widely used third-party service can allow malicious scripts to spread across numerous organizations at once.
This approach creates significant challenges for businesses that rely on external tools for analytics, website optimization, marketing and customer engagement.
The attack also follows several other security incidents involving third-party infrastructure and web applications.
In October, cybersecurity warnings highlighted critical vulnerabilities in PHP that could potentially allow attackers to compromise servers.
Prediction market platform Polymarket also experienced a security incident linked to a compromised third-party provider, amid reports that some users had funds drained from their accounts.
Together, these developments emphasize the importance of monitoring external scripts, restricting third-party access and strengthening controls around sensitive financial operations.
For cryptocurrency users, the Optimjack campaign reinforces the need to verify wallet addresses immediately before confirming transactions, even when those addresses are copied from apparently legitimate websites.
For businesses, the incident raises broader questions about how much trust should be placed in externally hosted code that can execute directly within customer-facing websites.
The attack illustrates a fundamental cybersecurity challenge: even well-established brands can expose users to financial theft when the external software they depend on becomes compromised.